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This paper investigates the benefits of applying a Bayesian Network in quantitative risk assessment of 
the integrity of an offshore gas turbine driven generator. The focus of the research is based on the 
potential failures and incidents associated with an offshore gas turbine running overspeed and failures 
within the switchboard. The potential consequences that follow said failures, such as fire, explosion and 
damage to mechanical equipment are also factored into the analysis. A methodology is outlined in order 
to construct a coherent BN model. This methodology consists of several steps, starting with identifying 
variables, to then constructing a qualitative BN model from these variables. The methodology culminates 
in validation of the BN model. A case study, regarding individual and combined component failures is 
also applied to demonstrate and validate the methodology. The Bayesian network allows the cause-effect 
relationships to be modelled through clear graphical representation. Similarly, the model can 
accommodate for continual updating of failure data. Partial validity of the model is demonstrated against 
some benchmark axioms. It is vital to maintain that the model must remain practical and close to reality 
from the perspective of gathering data and generating results. 
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1 Introduction 
This research focuses on the continued development of 
Bayesian Network (BN) models, for modelling the relationship 
between failures and consequences of an offshore gas turbine. 
The intention is to model a sequence of events following a 
number of component failures, under certain conditions and 
assumptions. 
Previous research has defined these initial failures as control 
system failures and physical or structural failures. The previous 
BN models in this research have outlined the relationships 
between these initial failures and potential Hydrocarbon (HC) 
releases and fire and explosion consequences. These BNs, along 
with the model presented in this paper, should provide a base 
with which to expand the BN model to facilitate the requirement 
of having a dynamic risk assessment model that allows for 
accurate representation of the hazards and consequences 
associated with gas turbine failures. 
The research presented within this paper is an expansion of 
previous research conducted for an electrical generation system 
of an offshore installation. The initial research, conducted by 
Loughney & Wang (2017), focused on creating a dynamic risk 
assessment model for an electrical generation system, based 
upon one initial component failure in the form of a rotor 
retaining ring failure. A sequence of events and a BN were 
produced to demonstrate the cause and effect relationships 
between the safety critical elements of the generator. The BN 
demonstrated a number of potential consequences, such as, Gas 
Import Riser failure and High Pressure Gas Flare Drum failure, 
resulting in a potential HC release. These final consequences 
were not expanded or demonstrated in detail to keep the 
complexity of the model as low as possible while achieving 
valid results. Similarly, Loughney et al. (2018) further 
developed a BN model that focused on gas turbine fuel gas 
release and the resulting ignition consequences (Loughney, et 
al., 2018).  
This research expands on this by constructing a new BN 
network that combines the HC release scenarios of Loughney & 
Wang (2017) and the ignition scenarios of Loughney et al. 
(2018). Gas turbine generator sets, particularly aeroderivative 
gas turbines, are sensitive to electrical faults that can severely 
damage the turbine and surrounding equipment. Hence, this 
new BN demonstrates the potential HC release consequences of 
an offshore gas turbine running overspeed along with the 
potential ignition consequences resulting from an electrical 
overload (Loughney & Wang, 2017) (Loughney, et al., 2018).  
2 Background  
2.1 Overspeed 
A gas turbine generator usually consists of three key mechanical 
components; the gas turbine, the gearbox and the generator. 
These components are all connected through couplings, which 
must be able to cope with any potential misalignments and 
displacements caused by failures in the system. A gearbox is 
essential in virtually all generator sets. This is because the 
generator will operate between 1,500 to 3,000 rpm and the gas 
turbine can operate anywhere from 3,600 to 20,000 rpm. 
However, in this research the gas turbine operates at 3,600 rpm 
(RMRI Plc., 2009) (Perera, et al., 2016) (HSE, 2006).  
Several events or scenarios may lead to a gas turbine running 
overspeed. A shaft failure may lead to the decoupling of the 
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compressor and the turbine mounted on the shaft. This 
decoupling can incite an event whereby the power produced by 
the turbine is not absorbed by the compressor. In this situation 
the gas expansion in the turbine does not immediately halt, as 
the gas is still flowing in the main gas path. This continued flow 
of gas, for however brief a time it exists after the failure, can 
cause the rotor to accelerate. This can result in severe 
deformation to the turbine, and the other components, if it is not 
restrained. This is known as a shaft overspeed event (Fetenant, 
et al., 2012) (Almasi, 2011).  
Two types of failures most commonly lead to a shaft over-speed 
event; control system failures and shaft breakage. The latter can 
occur not as a primary cause only but late in the failure event, 
potentially resulting in a gas fire or explosion. However, there 
is a substantial difference between the failures, which can arise 
from the location of the speed probes in the engine. The engine 
control obtains measures of the speed of the shafts from probes 
that are located on the compressor end of the shaft. These are 
usually housed in the internal gearbox. If the shaft is severed 
behind the location of these probes, they can only read the 
falling speed of the compressor end of the spool, and the engine 
control has no notion that the turbine is running overspeed 
(Onsite Energy, 2013) (Pawsey, et al., 2018).  
On the other hand, control system failures can be arrested by the 
activation of over-speed protection devices that shut down the 
fuel flow when the speed probes read values over a prescribed 
threshold. This is also possible because the engine’s response to 
control system failures is milder and slower than to an 
instantaneous shaft breakage. According to Gallar (2010) the 
timing of shaft overspeed events are of the order of hundreds of 
milliseconds, whereas the control failure develops over times 
around tens of milliseconds. Furthermore, it is also stated by 
Psarra et al. (2009) that if the terminal speed attained exceeds a 
certain critical limit, high-energy debris may be released from 
the engine compromising the safety of the operations. Similarly, 
RMRI Plc. (2009) concur that an overspeed event can release 
high-energy debris and projectiles. They state that the rotor 
retaining rings within aeroderivative gas turbines are 
susceptible to stress cracking given an overspeed event. This 
results in increased shaft displacement and potential bearing 
failure. This scenario was modelled by Loughney & Wang 
(2017), as previously stated. RMRI Plc. (2009) states that if the 
terminal speed attained exceeds a certain critical limit, high 
energy debris may be released from the engine compromising 
the safety of the operations. Given that the turbine runs at 
3,600rpm (normal speed), the radial deflection of a rotor-
retaining rings is approximately 1.5 mm, and the design of the 
rings allows them to withstand these stresses. However, when 
the turbine runs at 20% overspeed, the radial deflection 
becomes approximately 2.5 mm. This is an increase of 66% on 
the radial deflection for normal operating speeds. Therefore, it 
can be said that given that a turbine runs more than 20% 
overspeed, the rotor retaining rings increases the risks of 
retaining ring failure. However, there is some contention to this 
statement.  Brush Electrical Machines Ltd. (1999) state that 
“from the evidence available, there appears to be no correlation 
between the incidence of stress cracking and generator rating or 
speed”. What is key is that running overspeed has a great effect 
on the shaft alignment and can damage components if the shaft 
vibrations are greater than the design tolerance. It can still be 
said that running overspeed does have an effect on other 
components of the rotor assembly, potentially exposing 
component stresses close to their yield strength. Therefore, it is 
advisable that stress analyses of components should be 
conducted to determine the status of components following an 
overspeed event, to determine whether there is an increased 
probability of failure (Chacartegui, et al., 2011) (HSE, 2006) 
(Perera, et al., 2015) (Pawsey, et al., 2018) (RMRI Plc., 2009).   
The failures outlined thus far are all related to the mechanical 
side of the gas turbine operations. However, if the pure 
mechanical failures are disregarded, the potential source for 
overspeed is the generator. Electrical fault conditions in the 
generator can produce over torques, which can spread 
backwards in the system. It is possible that these events can 
expose the turbine and gearbox components to excessive torque 
and speed. There are two types of electrical fault that can cause 
this; mal-synchronization and short circuit at generator 
terminals. Both events can produce torque peaks at the 
generator output of ten times the full load torque. The nature 
and size of the torque peaks are usually known and defined by 
the manufacturer. These situations can be complex, as a 
dynamic analysis of the torque fault conditions is required in 
order to determine the magnitude of the torque that reaches the 
gas turbine.  
2.2 Overload and electrical ignition 
When designing an electrical power generator, there is a 
responsibility to meet code requirements to ensure that the 
electrical equipment is protected against destructive current 
flows. These current flows can produce temperatures in 
electrical components and wiring that are above the specified 
rating and design limits. The protection from is usually termed 
“overcurrent protection” and are caused by equipment 
overloads by short circuits or ground faults. These overloads 
occur when equipment and components are subjected to 
currents above their design rating, producing excessive heat. 
Short circuits generally occur when there is an unintentional, 
direct line to line connection between conductors, and can 
potentially generate temperatures of thousands of degrees above 
the stated design ratings. Similarly, ground faults occur when 
an electrical current flows from a conductor to some uninsulated 
metal, which is not design to conduct electricity in the system. 
These ground currents can be exceptionally hazardous to 
personnel and other electrical based systems in contact with the 
foreign metal structure or object (Boeman, 2013) (Lee, 2018).  
The two most common protection measures from overloads and 
overcurrents are fuses and circuit breakers. Fuses are the 
simplest form of overcurrent protection. They consist of a 
conducting element enclosed in a tube of non-conductive 
material and connected by ferules at each end. The ferules fit 
into slots to allow the fuse to complete a split circuit. In the 
event of excess current flowing through the circuit, the 
conducting element melts and breaks the circuit, interrupting 
the current flow. This means that a fuse can only be used once 
before it must be replaced, which is a massive disadvantage 
when compared to circuit breakers which can be reset (Onsite 
Energy, 2013).  
Circuit breakers are automatically operated switches designed 
to protect the circuit from overload or short circuit.  There are a 
number of circuit breaker types utilized in industry, depending 
on the required level of protection: 
• Inverse Time Trips: These trip faster as current increases. 
They provide overload protection, however, they also allow 
equipment and conductors to briefly experience excessive 
loads.  
• Adjustable Trips: These are used when the operation of 
several protection devices in a system must be coordinated. 
Designers place the lowest rated trips nearest to the devices 
being protected so that a fault in one area is isolated but 
allows current elsewhere in the system to continue to flow. 
• Instantaneous Trips: These use only the magnetic element 
of the trip and provide no overload protection. Also known 
as motor circuit protectors, or MCPs, they normally are 
used to protect large motors from short circuits and ground 
faults. 
Short circuits can produce enough thermal and electromagnetic 
forces to destroy any protective device. When selecting a 
protective device, it is vital to consider the available short circuit 
amperage, which is the potential amperage at any site in the 
system. Further consequences of this are potential electrical 
ignition sources (Courty & Garo, 2017).  
Ignition and burning of electrical cables are possible causes of 
fires in an offshore setting. Similarly, cables may also lose their 
functions or be less efficient when exposed to heat sources 
(progressive change in resistance, deterioration of the signal 
quality and shortcut). Electrical cables have an insulation layer 
which is potentially flammable and may decompose at high 
temperatures. In nuclear power plants, electrical wire is a major 
source of fire ignition, consisting of 42% of total fires (Fisher, 
et al., 2015). Most electrical fires are caused by short circuit, 
overheating and worn wire with the ignition of insulation 
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attached to the wires (Wang, et al., 2016). Once ignited, fires 
would propagate along the wire and ignite nearby combustibles, 
releasing heat, smoke and toxic gas.  
Furthermore, arc flashes pose a particular risk in an offshore 
environment with lower voltage machinery with between 480V 
and 600V and medium voltage machinery of >600V. This 
includes equipment such as switches, fuses, circuit breakers or 
relays. An arc flash is the light and heat produced from an 
electric arc supplied with sufficient electrical energy to cause 
substantial damage, harm, fire, or injury. These arc flashes are 
most commonly caused by during a fault, or short circuit 
condition. One of the most common causes of arc-flash injuries 
happens when switching on electrical circuits and, especially, 
tripped circuit-breakers. A tripped circuit-breaker often 
indicates a fault has occurred somewhere down the line from 
the panel. The fault must usually be isolated before switching 
the power on, or an arc flash can easily be generated. Small arcs 
usually form in switches when the contacts first touch, and can 
provide a place for an arc flash to develop. If the voltage is high 
enough, and the wires leading to the fault are large enough to 
allow a substantial amount of current, an arc flash can form 
within the panel when the breaker is turned on. According to 
RigZone Arc flash temperatures exceed 19,500OC, hotter than 
the sun's surface, with 700 miles per hour projectile-producing 
pressure, which can throw a person across a room. An estimated 
five to 10 arc flashes occur each day in the United States, 
according to a report from the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (Boeman, 2013) (CLarck, 
2018). 
It is events, such as those described in Section 2 that increase 
the requirement for a dynamic risk assessment model to 
accurately monitor the consequences of failures within gas 
driven generators. This is due to the fact that they are critical in 
the survival of crew members as well as the integrity of the 
respective offshore installation. As stated previously and given 
the literature review presented, the focus is the modelling of 
overspeed and overload events on HC release and potential 
ignition 
3 Methodology 
Many systematic procedures in use allow for construction of the 
various parts of the BN model. The procedures are useful as it 
allows for maintaining consistency throughout the process and 
offers an element of confidence to the model. The procedures 
varying depending on the context of the model and level of data 
available. The methodology for constructing the BN is adapted 
from previous research in Loughney & Wang (2017) and 
Loughney et al. (2018) (Fenton & Neil, 2013) (Loughney & 
Wang, 2017) (Loughney, et al., 2018). 
3.1 Establish the domain and definition   
This involves putting boundaries in place for the model. In this 
analysis the domain is to be defined as a module on a large 
offshore installation. The model begins with an initial 
component failure and tracks the cause and effect relationship 
of this failure on various other components and systems. The 
model ends with outlined consequences. The objective of the 
model involves stating what results are expected to be achieved 
from the model. For the model in this research the focus is on 
the interaction of the components and their probability of 
occurrence. 
3.2 Identify the set of variables relative to the problem 
This involves filtering possible parameters that are relevant to 
the description and objective. For the model the initial variables 
were devised utilizing a sequence of events diagram. This 
sequence of events diagram represents the steps of various 
events with their order and causality. The events in the diagram 
are connected with arcs and arrows. This allows for a 
straightforward transition to a BN.  
3.3 Form nodes and arcs for the BN 
The events and consequences in the sequence of events are 
translated to corresponding parent and child nodes in the 
Bayesian Network. The sequence of events, however, is basic 
and the arcs do not directly translate to the BN. The nodes can 
be expressed as positive or negative. The causality between the 
events is translated to corresponding Conditional Probability 
Tables (CPTs). Once the relevant nodes are identified, they are 
input into a BN software package, HuginResearcher, and 
connected. This entails referring to the sequence of events from 
the initial failure to determine the most effective way of 
connecting the nodes together. The network is reviewed to 
ensure that there are no missing factors. 
3.4 Data acquisition and analysis 
Primarily, data is sought from various sources including: 
industrial & academic publications, offshore risk assessment 
projects, as well as databases such as; the Offshore Reliability 
Database (OREDA), HSE and the International Association of 
Oil and Gas Producers database (OGP). However, should data 
not be widely available or the CPT for a node be much too large 
to construct utilizing data from the outlined sources, then 
methods of Boolean logic shall be applied. In this research that 
method is a Noisy-Or gate or a Noisy-AND gate (HSE, 2014) 
(HSE, 2008) (HSE, 2012) (Lloyds Register, 2016) (OGP, 2010) 
(Atkins, 2008) (OREDA, 2009).  
A Noisy-Or gate is convenient for describing a class of 
uncertain relationships in Bayesian networks. This 
generalization is a useful modeling aid and in this research the 
Noisy-OR model is applied to one type of situation or 
connection in the BN. In these connections or situations at least 
one of the parent nodes Xi must be in a positive state in order 
for the child node Y to have a chance, Pi, of being in a positive 
state. Furthermore, any combination of positive parent nodes 
can result in a positive child node with each combination 
potentially resulting in a different probability, Pi. For example, 
it is difficult to determine the CPT for the node Fault Detection 
& Shutdown” so Noisy-OR is applied. In this case if either of 
the parent nodes (“Overload” or “Potential for Overspeed”) are 
positive, i.e. in the state “Yes”, then the Child node will also be 
in the positive state “Yes”. Table 1 shows a brief example of 
this relationship where 1 represents a node in a positive state 
and Pi represents the probability of the child node (Srinivas, 
1993) (Vomlel, 2015).  
Table 1. Example of a Noisy-OR truth table 
Parent Child 
XA XB Y 
0 0 0 
1 0 1×P1 
0 1 1×P2 
1 1 1×P(1,2) 
In the case of a Noisy-AND gate all of the parent nodes must be in a 
positive state for the child node to have a chance of being in a positive 
state as shown in Table 2. In essence the only conjunctive effect of the 
parent node is shown by Eq. 1. 
𝑃(𝑌|𝑋𝐴, 𝑋𝐵) = {1 𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝐴 = 𝑥1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋𝐵 = 𝑥𝐵 , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 0}  (1) 
An example of a Noisy-AND gate can be seen in the node “Ignition 
Source”. In this case the an ignition source would only be present if the 
parent nodes “Fault Detection & Shutdown” and “Switchboard 
Overload” are in the States “No” and “Yes” Respectively. This is 
demonstrated by Table 2. In this case the state “Yes” is represented by 
1 and the state “No” is represented by 0 (Matellini, 2012) (Matellini, et 
al., 2013). 
Table 2. Example of a Noisy-AND truth table 
Parent Child 
XA XB Y 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 1 1×P(1,2) 
1 1 0 
3.5 Analysis of BN model  
This step concerns itself with the analysis of the BN model 
using Bayesian Inference. The probability of failure on demand 
of the operation is obtained by forward analysis. The posterior 
probabilities of the influencing factors can be calculated 
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through backward analysis, given some evidence entered into 
the model. The propagation of the BN is conducted using 
HuginResearcher. The results of the analysis provide useful 
information in handling the effect of one failure on multiple 
components and systems.  
3.6 Partial validation of the BN Model  
Validation is a key aspect of the methodology as it provides a 
reasonable amount of confidence to the results of the model. In 
carrying out a full validation of the model, the parameters 
should be closely monitored for a given period of time. For 
modelling a specific failure within an electrical generator, this 
exercise is not practical. In current work and literature, there is 
a three axiom based validation procedure, which is used for 
partial validation of the proposed BN model. The three axioms 
to be satisfied are as follows (Jones, et al., 2010) (Ashrafi, et al., 
2017) (Fenton & Neil, 2013): 
• Axiom i:  
A small increase or decrease in the prior subjective probabilities 
of each parent node should certainly result in the effect of a 
relative increase or decrease of the posterior probabilities of the 
child node. 
• Axiom ii: 
Given the variation of subjective probability distributions of 
each parent node, its influence magnitude to the child node 
should be kept consistent. 
• Axiom iii:  
The total influence magnitudes of the combination of the 
probability variations from “x” attributes (evidence) on the 
values should always be greater than that from the set of “x-y” 
(y ϵ x) attributes. 
The methodology outlined in section 3 will be demonstrated in 
the Case Study in section 4. 
4 Cast Study 
4.1 Establishing the domain and definition 
In order to demonstrate the proposed methodology a case study 
is used to evaluate of the effects overspeed and overload have 
on a gas turbine generator, particularly the HC release and 
ignition consequences. The electrical generation unit is 
considered to be of a generic layout for electrical generation on 
a large platform. The generator consists of a primary alternator, 
driven by a gas turbine. Located after the alternator is the 
exciter. The alternator rotor and shaft are forged in one piece 
with the exciter coupled on to one end. The opposite end of the 
shaft is coupled to the turbine drive shaft, which has an 
approximate operating speed of 3,600 rpm. The main shaft is 
supported by two main bearings, housed in pedestals, on stools 
on the baseplate. One bearing is situated between the turbine 
and the alternator and the other between the alternator and the 
exciter. Furthermore the combination of a HC and an electrical 
ignition source are considered feasible in this situation as the 
model, as with previous BN models produced in literature 
(Loughney & Wang (2017) and Loughney et al. (2018)), is 
based upon the layout of the Thistle Alpha Platform in the North 
Sea. It can be seen from Figure 1 that the HC containment and 
the potential sources of electrical ignition are in close proximity. 
The module housing the switchboard and transformers is 
located directly above the three adjacent modules housing the  
Figure 1. Northern view of the thistle Alpha Platform showing the 
location of key equipment 
HP (High Pressure) gas flare drum, the generators and the gas 
import risers. Units A and B are the primary generator sets, 
while Unit C is the emergency generator. This research focuses 
on the mina generator sets (RMRI Plc., 2009).  
In order to establish the domain and definition of the model, 
some assumptions are made. These assumptions are as follows: 
• The model has been built for the situation where the 
offshore platform contains no crew and hence does not 
consider fatalities. There are two key reasons and they 
relate to the purpose of the dynamic risk assessment model. 
Firstly, the BN model can be applied an NUI (Normally 
Unattended Installation), where humans are not present on 
the platform for large periods of time, and are monitored 
from other platforms or onshore. Secondly, the BN can be 
applied to manned installations but where remote 
monitoring can be utilized to remove personnel from 
hazardous and dangerous situations and locations. Hence 
fatalities are not part of the initial model. 
• The models purpose is to demonstrate that the cause and 
effect relationships between offshore failure modes, 
systems and components can be modelled effectively 
utilizing the methodology stated in section 3.  
• There are many component failures that can have an effect 
on the outcomes of the stated events, however, the BN 
model presented is part of a series of development cases. 
Hence, the cause and effects of a finite number of 
component failures and consequences are analyzed, to 
show that the model is valid before expansion to include 
crossovers of other scenarios.  
• When the node “Fault Detection & shutdown” is in the state 
“Yes”, the relevant sensors have detected either overspeed 
or a current overload and the turbine and generator are 
shutdown. Having the barriers and fail safe in node serves 
to reduce the complexity of the model. Once the model is 
expanded with other situations, the barriers are to be 
modelled as a separate mitigation stage.  
• In the case of “Gas Import Riser Impact” it is possible for 
the for the turbine blades of generator Unit B on the Thistle 
Alpha Platform to impact the riser in Module 5a. The 
location of which is shown in Figure 1. 
• The HP Flare Drum outlined in the Node “HP Flare Drum 
Impact” is located in an adjacent module this impact is 
considered in the even the exciter detaches. The energy 
required to uproot and move the mass associated with the 
exciter is sufficient to cause the detached exciter to 
penetrate the module wall and damage adjacent HC 
containment. 
4.2 Identifying the set of variables 
The variables are identified based upon a number of control and 
electrical failures. Should there be a failure in the control system 
or a sudden loss of load, the turbine could potentially run 
overspeed, if the faults are not detected and the turbine 
shutdown. This would cause the main shaft to become 
unbalanced causing potential damage to certain components 
such as, the retaining rings or the bearings. Given the extreme 
tolerances’ within the generator construction, the unbalanced 
shaft could also cause damage to other areas of the equipment, 
such as: the turbine blades and the exciter. (RMRI Plc., 2009).  
From this the most likely point of failure within the turbine is 
the turbine blades shearing. Multiple blade failure could lead to 
the turbine casing not fully containing the turbine blade debris. 
This situation has been analyzed by Loughney & Wang (2017). 
This would result in turbine blades being expelled through the 
turbine casing as high velocity projectiles. Continually, the 
violent shaft vibrations and misalignment could have a severe 
impact on the exciter and may result in the exciter, weighing 
approximately one metric ton, becoming detached from the 
main shaft. Some catastrophic failures have resulted in the 
exciter breaking up and some have had the exciter remain 
mostly intact (RMRI Plc., 2009) (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 2008). 
Regarding the event of an electrical ignition source being 
present, the variables are defined from literature. In this case the 
failures are associated with a short-circuit event, and a failure in 
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the voltage control, both of which are outlines in Section 2.2. 
From here the event escalates in conjunction with multiple 
literature sources. There is an overload to the switchboard via a 
circuit breaker. The probability of a circuit breaker activating 
and the turbine shutting down is also included in the “Fault 
Detection & Shutdown Node”. In the event that the circuit 
breaker fails there is a possibility of an electrical ignition source. 
This event is encapsulated by the node “Ignition Source” and 
considers the probability of an arc-flash and extreme 
temperatures in wiring. These temperatures can easily exceed 
the flash point of the gas in both HC containment units in this 
BN model.  
4.3 Forming the BN 
The BN model structure is demonstrated in Figure 2, along with 
the marginal probabilities of the nodes. Table 3 outlines the 
abbreviations used in the BN and in the Analysis. The BN 
follows the sequence of events of the identified variables and 
events. The model consists of 17 nodes and all contain the states 
“Yes” or “No”, with the exception of two. The node IG utilizes 
two states relating to the immediate or delayed ignition from the 
HP flare drum failure, two states relating to the immediate or 
delayed ignition of the gas from the import riser and a state 
where there is no ignition. These states are as follows: 
“Immediate (HP Tank)”, “Delayed (HP Tank”, “Immediate 
(Riser)”, “Immediate (Riser)”, “Delayed (Riser)” and “None”. 
The node FEXP has three states, these are “Fire”, “Explosion”, 
and “None”. This node outlines the occurrence probability of 
either a fire or an explosion.  
 
Table 3. Abbreviations used in the BN model and the analysis. 
 
Abbreviation Node Name 
CSF Control System Failure 
LL Loss of Load 
VCF Voltage Control Failure 
SC Short Circuit 
PFO Potential For Overspeed 
PSS Power Surge to Switchboard 
SBO Switchboard Overload 
FD&S Fault Detection & Shutdown 
IGS Ignition Source 
TRO Turbine Runs Overspeed 
FDS Fault Detection & Shutdown 
TRO  Turbine Runs Overspeed 
TBX Turbine Blades Expelled 
ED Exciter Detaches 
GIR Gas Import Riser Impact 
HPF HP Flare Drum Impact 
HCR HC Release 
IG Immediate or Delayed Ignition 
IG - I-Tank IG - Immediate - Tank 
IG - D-Tank IG - Delayed Tank 
IG - I-Riser IG - Immediate Riser 
IG - D- Riser IG - Delayed Riser 




4.4 Data acquisition and analysis 
It is important to note that the numerical results of the model are 
not significant in terms of being absolute, but rather to serve to 
demonstrate the practicability of the model. Once a full set of 
verified data is fed into the model, the confidence level 
associated with planning and decision making under uncertainty 
will improve.  
To complete the CPTs within a BN, certain data and knowledge 
is required regarding each specific node. For some nodes data 
is limited or not available. For cases where there is an absence 
of hard data, CPTs must be completed through subjective 
reasoning. As previously stated in Section 3.4, a Noisy-OR gate 
and a Noisy-AND gate have been applied to complete CPTs in 
the BN. 
4.5 Analysis of the BN 
The Bn has been used to analyze a number of possible real-
world scenarios.  The Hugin software allows for evidence to be 
insert-ed to all nodes within the network in its “Run Mode” 
function. This evidence is to the degree of 100% in a given state 
of a node. It is the posterior probabilities that are of interest and 
are computed given particular evidence of specific nodes. All 
values in the analysis are percentage probabilities. 
 
Figure 2. BN model structure along with the marginal probabilities of 
each node. 
4.5.1 Test Case 1 
This case study demonstrates the effects of the root nodes 
“CSF”, “LL”, “VCF” and “SC” on the BN model. This analysis 
shall focus on the node “FD&S” and the potential for ignition, 
demonstrating the role of the incident prevention measures. The 
analysis is to be split and will focus on “CSF” and “LL” together 
and “VCF” and “SC” together. Table 4 shows the effect of 
“CSF” and “LL” on key nodes and states in the BN. References 
to the abbreviations can be found in Table 3. Each test case in 
the analysis will show focus nodes and states with no evidence 
inserted into the hypothesis nodes. In Table 4, these hypothesis 
nodes are “CSF” and “LL” evidence is then inserted into a given 
state in the hypothesis node and the posterior probabilities of 
the focus nodes are analyzed. 
 






Evidence CSF-Yes LL-Yes 
FCS + LL-
Yes 
PFO 5.44 27.00 19.60 41.70 
FD&S 11.25 24.95 20.25 33.95 
TRO 16.09 13.6 14.45 11.97 
HCR 0.00743 0.00724 0.0073 0.00711 
IG-I-Tank 6.88E-08 5.89E-08 6.23E-08 5.24E-08 
IG-D-Tank 6.37E-08 5.46E-08 5.77E-08 4.85E-08 
IG-I-Riser 2.47E-08 2.12E-08 2.24E-08 1.88E-08 
IG-D- Riser 1.96E-08 1.68E-08 1.78E-08 1.49E-08 
 
From Table 4 it can be seen that “CSF” has a greater effect on 
the system than “LL”. Similarly, both nodes demonstrate a large 
cumulative effect on nodes “PFO” and FD&S”. However, it can 
be seen that the posterior probabilities of overspeed (TRO) or 
HC release (HCR) decrease when evidence is inserted into the 
root nodes. This demonstrates that the barrier node “FD&S” is 
operating in the BN as expected. It is assumed in this analysis 
that the barriers mitigating against incidents would operate as 
expected. Therefore, in the event of an increased probability of 
initial faults, there is an increased probability in the detection 
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and prevention of further escalation.  What is also apparent from 
the analysis is the very negligible effect on the probabilities of 
immediate or delayed ignition from either the gas riser or the 
HP tank. This is due to the system again detecting a fault and 
halting the process. Thus, reducing the probability of an 
overspeed event. Similarly, this section of the BN model has no 
effect on the probability of an ignition source being present. 
Hence, any incidents would only result in a HC release and not 
an ignition incident. 
Table 5 demonstrates the effect of “VCF” and “SC” on key 
nodes and states in the BN. 
 
Table 5. Effects of the root nodes “VCF” and “SC” both separately and 
cumulatively. 
 
Focus Nodes No Evidence VCF- Yes SC-Yes 
VCF + SC-
Yes 
PSS 0.37 4.99 0.93 5.53 
SBO 0.55 1.21 0.63 1.29 
FDS 11.25 11.67 11.3 11.72 
IGS 0.00926 0.02 0.0001 0.02 
HCR 0.00743 0.00742 0.00743 0.00742 
IG-I-Tank 6.88E-08 1.51E-07 7.88E-08 1.61E-07 
IG-D-Tank 6.37E-08 1.40E-07 7.30E-08 1.49E-07 
IG-I-Riser 2.47E-08 5.42E-08 2.83E-08 5.77E-08 
IG-D-Riser 1.96E-08 4.30E-08 2.25E-08 4.58E-08 
 
It can be seen that “VCF” has a much greater effect on the child 
nodes when compared to “SC”. Similarly, the effect from either 
node on the child nodes is not very large. What can also be seen 
is the effect of node “FD&S” on the BN as seen in Table 4. 
Furthermore, this section of the BN should have a negligible 
effect on the probability of HC release. This is proven by the 
posterior probabilities in table 5, where there is almost zero 
change in the posterior probability of a HC release. What is 
apparent is the increase change in the probability of an ignition. 
In Table 4 the probability of ignition does increase past 10-8, yet 
in Table 5 a greater change, by comparison, can be seen as the 
probability increases to 10-7 in some cases. This demonstrates 
that even without a HC release, a small increase in an ignition 
source being present. This demonstrates that an ignition source 
may have a greater effect on the probability of fire or explosion 
than a HC release, dispute the fact that both are required to cause 
either of the consequences.  
4.5.2 Test case 2  
Test case 2 shall demonstrate the effects of potential overspeed 
and overload events. In this case the likelihood of an ignition 
source and a HC release being present are analyzed due to 
events that can initiate either or both consequences. Table 6 
demonstrates the posterior probabilities of certain focus nodes 
given individual and cumulative overspeed and overload events. 
 
Table 6. Individual and cumulative effects of potential overspeed and 





Evidence PFO-Yes  SBO-Yes 
PFO + 
SBO-Yes 
FDS 11.25 71.31 75.10 90.80 
TRO 16.08 5.20 4.51 1.67 
TBX 6.38 2.12 1.74 0.74 
ED 8.11 2.67 2.33 0.10 
GIR 7.38 6.58 6.53 6.32 
HPF 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 
IGS 0.00962 0.00355 1.74 0.64 
HCR 7.43E-03 6.60E-03 6.55E-05 6.33E-03 
IG-I-Tank 6.88E-08 2.54E-06 1.25E-07 4.61E-06 
IG-D-Tank 6.37E-08 2.35E-08 1.15E-07 4.27E-06 
IG-I-Riser 2.47E-08 9.13E-09 4.48E-07 1.66E-06 
IG-D- Riser 1.96E-08 7.25E-09 3.55E-08 1.31E-06 
 
It can be seen from Table 6 that the “FD&S” node is greatly 
affected by an overspeed or overload event occurring. The 
assumption again is that the detection system operates as 
designed. Hence the 90.8% probability of a fault detection and 
shutdown given both an overspeed and overload event occur.  
This can also be seen by the decrease in the probability of a HC 
release occurring, due to the reduced probability of the “TRO” 
node. However, what can be seen is an increase in the 
probability of an ignition source. This is because there is a small 
probability the cabling from the generator to the circuit breaker 
can achieve very high temperatures before the circuit breaker 
activates. This wiring has the potential to reach high 
temperatures and damage the insulation around the cabling. As 
stated in Section 2, it is possible for the damaged insulation 
around the cable to burn and produce flammable gases. Hence 
there is still a small in crease in the chance of an ignition source 
being present. This also demonstrates that overspeed and 
overload sections are somewhat independent as the probability 
of ignition only increases when there is an overload event.  
4.5.3 Test Case 3 
Test case 3 demonstrates the individual and cumulative effect 
of a HC release and the presence of an Ignition source. This 
scenario assumes that either an overspeed event or an overload 
event has occurred and either one or both is not detected. Table 
7 demonstrates the posterior probabilities of each ignition 
scenario and the potential fire and explosion consequences.  
 
Table 7. Individual and cumulative effects of a HC release and 









IG-I-Tank 6.88E-08 9.27E-04 7.16E-04 9.44 
IG-D-Tank 6.37E-08 8.58E-04 6.63E-04 8.74 
IG-I-Riser 2.47E-08 3.33E-04 2.57E-04 3.39 
IG-D- Riser 1.96E-08 2.64E-04 2.04E-04 2.69 
Fire 3.63E-09 4.88E-05 3.77E-05 0.50 
Explosion 4.26E-09 5.74E-05 4.43E-05 0.58 
 
Form Table 7 it can be seen that the probability of an ignition, 
and subsequently a fire or explosion consequence, increases 
when either a HC release has occurred, or an ignition source is 
present. This provides some evidence that the BN further 
operates as intended. In order for an ignition incident to occur 
there must be a source of ignition and a fuel source. Similarly, 
the fuel source must be in an oxygen mixture of the correct 
proportions. Therefore, the probability of an ignition event is 
still relatively low when only one event of a release or an 
ignition source occurs. However, when both events are 
observed, the probabilities of any type of ignition, with either 
the riser or HP tank as the source, increases by a factor of 104. 
It can be seen that an ignition given a HP tank release is greater 
than that of the gas riser. This is because of the proximity of the 
release and the ignition source. In the event the gas riser is 
impacted by the turbine blades of Unit B, there are enough 
barriers to divert the release away from the ignition source, 
assuming the ignition source is in module 13 (See Figure 1). 
Similarly, in order for the HP tank to be impacted, an exciter 
must detach and penetrate the wall of module 2. This leaves a 
large section of the wall open to the potential release from the 
HP. Furthermore, the HP tank stores natural gas at a much 
higher pressure than that of the import riser, therefore the 
expansion after release will be much greater. Continually, the 
hole size produced by an exciter impacting the tank will also be 
much greater than the holes produce b y the turbine blades 
impacting the gas rise. Therefore, an ignition of the HC in the 
HP tank is much more likely.  
Finally, given that both events occur there is an increase in the 
probability of either a fire or an explosion also by a factor of 
104. The probability of an explosion is slightly higher dur to the 
fact that that explosions occur after a delayed ignition. 
Similarly, the proximity to the ignition source of the HC 
releases would suggest that a delayed ignition is more likely. 
However, given that the gas expansion from both sources, 
particularly from the HP tank, an immediate ignition is just as 
likely. Furthermore, the nature of the ignition source, i.e. an arc 
flash, is instantaneous. Therefore, the gas in the vicinity of the 
flash would ignite immediately and is more likely to cause a 
fire. That said, further testing is required in the time domain to 
more accurately demonstrate the fire and explosion 
consequences and map the HC releases over time at various 
release rates.  
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4.5.4 Test case 4 
 
To provide further verification of the BN model it is important 
to demonstrate the effects of inserting evidence as a 
consequence and observing the effects on prior nodes. The node 
in question in this test case is the “FEXP” node. Where evidence 
is inserted into the states “Fire” and “Explosion”. Table 8 
demonstrates the effect of the prior probabilities sin the BN 
when 100% evidence is inserted into the states “Fire” and 
“Explosion”.  
 
Table 8. Effect of 100% “Fire” and “Explosion” on the prior 




Evidence Fire EXP 
PSS 0.37 9.90 9.90 
SBO 0.55 100.00 100.00 
FDS 11.25 0.00 0.00 
TRO 16.08 32.96 32.96 
TBX 6.39 23.89 23.89 
ED 8.11 16.79 16.79 
GIR 7.38 99.51 99.51 
HPF 0.05 0.66 0.66 
IGS 0.01 100.00 100.00 
HCR 0.007 100.00 100.00 
IG-I-Tank 6.88E-08 64.15 0.00 
IG-D-Tank 6.37E-08 25.19 91.35 
IG-I-Riser 2.47E-08 8.27 0.00 
IG-D-Riser 1.96E-08 2.39 8.65 
 
It can be seen from Table 8 that when the “Fire” and 
“Explosion” states are observed individually, four nodes 
demonstrate 100% or 0.00% occurrence. The nodes that 
demonstrate 100% occurrence are “SBO”, “IGS” and “HCR”. 
This is in line with previous analyses and hypotheses whereby 
a fire or explosion requires and ignition source and a HC 
release.  It also make sense that the node “SBO” is at 100% as 
in this BN an overload is required for the ignition source to 
occur. However, there are a couple of situations that can cause 
a HC release. In this case there is a 99.51% chance that the HCR 
is caused by “GIR” and a 0.66% chance that it is “HPF”. This 
also makes sense as a riser impact is comparatively much more 
likely than a HP tank impact. The node that demonstrates a 0% 
chance of occurrence is “FD&D” which is also in conjunction 
with previous statements as the consequences will only occur if 
faults are not detected. Furthermore, when an Explosion occurs, 
both “IG-I” are at 0%, further demonstrating that a a delayed 
ignition is required.  
4.5.5 Partial Validation 
For partial validation of the model, it should satisfy the three 
axioms stated in Section 3.6. Given the demonstrated analysis 
in Section 4.5 and the behavior of the prior and posterior 
probabilities when subjected to different situations, it can be 
said that the BN model satisfies the outlined axioms. Therefore, 
some partial validation can be given to the model.  
5 Conclusions 
The BN model presented in this research demonstrates the 
effect that several initial failures have on a potential HC release 
and potential electrical ignition source along with the potential 
fire and explosion consequences that can occur. These 
consequences are equally important for offshore platform 
operators due to the additional HSE regulations within Safety 
Cases regarding hazards to the environment in any instance. 
Therefore, if there is a HC release without ignition, it poses a 
large issue for operators and duty holders given that the release 
is undetected.  
The analysis presented in the four test cases clearly 
demonstrates the vital role that the mitigating barriers play in 
preventing severe. The BN model also clearly demonstrates that 
it can provide an effective and applicable method of 
determining the likelihood of various events under uncertainty, 
and more importantly show increased uses as a dynamic risk 
assessment tool. This is especially applicable in monitoring 
offshore areas where personnel are not normally present. 
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